Notes and Comments: Pretrial Detention in Maryland: The Aftermath of Gerstein v. Pugh by Mintz, Shelly E.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 5
Issue 2 Spring 1976 Article 7
1976
Notes and Comments: Pretrial Detention in
Maryland: The Aftermath of Gerstein v. Pugh
Shelly E. Mintz
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mintz, Shelly E. (1976) "Notes and Comments: Pretrial Detention in Maryland: The Aftermath of Gerstein v. Pugh," University of
Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 5: Iss. 2, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol5/iss2/7
PRETRIAL DETENTION IN MARYLAND: 
THE AFTERMATH OF GERSTEIN V. PUGH 
In Gerstein v. Pugh the United States Supreme Court held that 
although a suspect arrested without a warrant is entitled to a 
judicial determination of probable cause to detain, the pro-
cedure tor such a determ ination is not a "critical stage" of the 
prosecution. The author examines the implementation of the 
Gerstein decision in Maryland and concludes that the present 
procedures are inadequate to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights of an accused. 
A deep-seated tradition in the American legal system is its repug-
nance toward arbitrary arrest. 1 The Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution2 expressly forbids it and similar provisions are 
contained in most of the state constitutions. 3 Nevertheless, pretrial 
1. The American attitude is founded upon precedents set by the British courts. Curtis Case, 
168 Eng. Rep. 67 (1756) (killing an arresting officer termed justifiable homicide due to 
officer's failure to adequately announce his mission prior to breaking into arrestee's 
home); Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (1604) (the sheriff may break into a suspect's 
dwelling to arrest him, but must first signify to the suspect the reason for the arrest); see 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (the Fourth Amendment implemented by the 
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, forbids the federal government from 
convicting a man of a crime by using testimony or papers obtained from him by arbitrary 
searches and seizures); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541 (1924); 
Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. REV. 361 (1921). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized [emphasis added]. 
The Fourth Amendment covers something other than the form of the warrant, creating a 
zone of privacy that no government official may enter, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 356-58 (1967); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 315 (1967) 
(dissenting opinion) and applies to arrest as well as search warrants; United States v. 
Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. 4112, 4117 (U.S. Jan. 26,1976) (No. 74-538) (concurring opinion); 
Beck v: Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 32 (1963); 
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 448 (1806). 
3. MD. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. 26, ptovides: 
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to 
seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants 
to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or 
describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal and ought not to be granted 
[emphasis added]. 
This article is derived verbatim from article 28 of the original Declaration of Rights, which 
was embodied in the Constitution of 1776. Despite the fact that the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution was adopted several years later, both have the same 
historical background. Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956); Salmon v. 
State, 2 Md. App. 513, 235 A.2d 758 (1967). See also, N.C. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. 11 
(1776); PA. CONST., art. 10 (1776); VA. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art 1, § 10 (1776); MASS. 
CONST., art. 14 (1780); N.H. CONST., art. 19 (1784); CALIF. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. 1, § 19 
(1849). 
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criminal procedures in many jurisdictions have tolerated the incarcera-
tion of the criminally accused without a determination by a judicial 
officer of the legality of the detention. Recently, however, the United 
States Supreme Court, in Gerstein v. Pugh,4 unanimously held that any 
suspect arrested without a warrant and charged by information must, as 
a Fourth Amendment right, S be afforded a prompt6 judicial determina-
tion of probable cause 7 before pretrial restraint of his liberty is 
permissable. 
4. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
5. The Fourth Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). 
6. The precise time within which the probable cause determination must be made has not 
been set by the Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts follow no uniform yardstick. cr. 
United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1972) (the existence of probable cause 
cannot be quantified by counting the number of days that have elapsed between the act in 
question and the issuance of the warrant). Article 310 of the American Law Institute 
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure divides the first appearance into two sessions, 
when the arrestee is in custody, and recommends that the probable cause hearing be held 
during the second session within forty-eight hours after arrest., ABA-ALI MODEL CODE OF 
PRE.ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 310.1(8), and 310.2(2) (1975). The Model Code 
proposal embodies the concept that while it is imperative that an arrestee be brought 
before a judicial officer as soon as possible to inform him of his rights, arrange for counsel 
and consider preliminary release on bail, it is also vital that once counsel is obtained he 
have an opportunity to argue effectively on behalf of his client that charges be dropped or 
that the arrestee be released on his own recognizance. Id. at Commentary § 310. 
Currently, notions as to the time within which a probable cause determination must be 
made vary from one jurisdiction to another. Only a minority of states specify definite 
time limitations for the probable cause hearing. Id. at Appendix I. 
7. The concept of probable cause does not lend itself to a rigid definition. In the United 
States the requirement appears to have originated in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in 
the trial of Aaron Burr. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 2, 12 (No. 14692a) (C.C. Va. 
1807). The traditional definition is that stated in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); 
[W]hether at that moment the factS and circumstances within their [the arresting 
officers] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information 
were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had 
committed or was committing an offense. 
Accord, United States v. Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. 4112, 4114 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976); Gerstein 
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 115 (1975); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969) 
(only the probability and not a prima facie showing of criminal activity is the standard of 
probable cause); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959) (the evidence 
necessary to establish probable cause need not rise to the level required to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt); Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923) 
(probable cause is a mixture of questions of law and fact: the truth and existence of the 
circumstances bearing on the issue being a question of fact, and the determination of 
whether the facts and circumstances found to exist and to be true constitute probable 
cause being a question of law); see, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 
(1948); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1931); Dumbra v. United States, 
268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498,504-05 (1925); Stacey v. 
Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878); Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 
(1813); Edwardsen v. State, 243 Md. 131, 135,220 A.2d 547, 549 (1965); Johnson v. 
State, 8 Md. App. 187, 191, 259 A.2d 97, 99 (1969); 
The rationale behind the probable cause concept and its importance was explained in 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949): 
These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreason-
able interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also 
seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection .... 
The rule of probable cause is a practical, non-technical conception affording the 
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In Gerstein, the respondents were arrested and imprisoned solely 
upon the authority of a prosecutor's information and were denied a 
probable cause hearing subsequent to their arrest. 8 Alleging a constitu-
tional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause, 
respondents sought declaratory and injunctive relief by filing a class 
action against various county officials.9 After an initial delay while the 
Florida legislature considered a bill allowing preliminary hearings lO for 
persons charged by information, the district court granted the relief 
sought. II The lower court held that a neutral and detached arbiter 
must promptly determine the existence of probable cause and ordered 
Dade County officials to submit a plan for providing a preliminary 
examination in all cases prosecuted by information. 12 On appeal the 
best compromise that has been found for accomodating these often opposing 
interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less 
would be to leave law abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. 
8. In Florida, at the time of respondents' arrest, when an accused was charged by 
information by the State Attorney and arrested, processing of the information did not 
commence until the arresting officer appeared before an assistant State Attorney and filed 
his affidavit of facts. Periods ranging from twenty·four hours to two weeks could elapse 
before the affidavit was filed and processing began. After filing the information 
twenty-four to seventy-two hours were required to prepare the information for filing with 
the Clerk of the Criminal Court of Record. The filing of the information foreclosed the 
suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. See State ex reI. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 
(Fla. 1972). The only means of obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause was a 
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after thirty days, FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 907.045 (1973) or arraignment which the District Court found was often delayed a 
month or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1110 (S.D. Fla. 1971). 
It was also the policy and practice of the State Attorney's office to resist any attempt to 
have a preliminary hearing after any information was filed or an indictment was filed. 
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
9. The named defendants originally included the sheriff, police chiefs, the state attorney, 
justices of the peace, and judges of the small claims courts. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. 
Supp. 1107, 1109 (S.D. Fla. 1971). Of the original defendants only Richard Gerstein, 
State Attorney for Dade County, Florida, petitioned for certiorari. 420 U.S. at 107 n. 8. 
10. Preliminary hearing is a term of art which generally refers to a probable cause hearing 
accorded a person charged by information. A preliminary hearing, if held early in the 
proceedings, is only one method of determining probable cause. This determination may 
also be incorporated into bail proceedings or the initial appearance. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. at 123-24. 
In Maryland the term initial appearance refers to "the defendant's first appearance 
before a District Court judge or commissioner after he is arrested or summoned." MD. 
DIST. RULE 702(e). 
11. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971). 
12. The court accepted the "Purdy Plan," submitted by Sheriff E. Wilson Purdy, calling for a 
judicial determination of probable cause at the initial appearance unless either the 
accused or the prosecutor was unprepared. In such event the hearing would be held 
within four days if the accused was in custody or within ten days if he was released 
pending trial. Committing magistrates were to be available for first appearance hearings 
on a twenty-four hour, seven day a week basis. The hearing was to be adversary in nature 
and if no probable cause was found the accused would be discharged. He could not be 
held to answer to a subsequent charge for the same offense filed by the State Attorney. 
The defendant could only be so charged upon an indictment by the grand jury returned 
within thirty days of defendant's discharge. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Pugh 
v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490 (S.D. Fla. 1972). The district court declared certain 
aspects of the "Purdy Plan" invalid after the Florida Supreme Court issued amended 
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Fifth Circuit affirmed 13 and State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for 
review. 14 A five to four majority of the Supreme Court decided that 
this determination need not be attended by the full panoply of rights 
applicable to "critical stages"IS of the prosecution, which normally 
include an evidentiary hearing, right to counsel, confrontation and 
cross-examination. 16 
The effect of Gerstein is that states, such as Maryland, which 
customarily grant hearings only to a select few l ? must revise their 
pretrial procedures. Maryland must now extend to all arrestees at least a 
cursory hearing examining probable cause to detain pending trial 
regardless of the nature of the crime. 18 A probable cause examination 
investigating the merits of scheduling a citizen for trial in Maryland is 
still confined to a limited class of arrestees, i.e. felons. 19 
The importance of the Gerstein decision is magnified by the 
prevalence of warrantless arrests in the United States.20 Although less 
persuasive evidence is required to justify issuance of a warrant than 
would justify a warrantless arrese l "it is routine [for officers] to make 
rules of criminal procedure. Pugh v. Rainwater, 335 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1972). 
Brief for Petitioner at 6·7, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
13. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1975). 
14. Gerstein v. Pugh, 414 U.S. 1062 (1973). Although the named respondents had been 
convicted and their pretrial detention thus ended, the Court ruled that this case belongs 
to a narrow class of cases in which the termination of a class representative's claim does 
not moot the claims of unnamed members of the class. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 
(1975) cited by the Court in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 110 n. 11 (1975);cf. Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Md. 
1975). 
15. Critical stage is that portion of the proceedings in which what transpires is likely to 
prejudice an ensuing trial. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); White v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); see DeToro v. Pepersack, 
332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964); Commonwealth v. 
Redshaw, 226 Pa. Super. 534, 322 A.2d 92 (1974); Timbers v. State, 2 Md. App. 672, 
236 A.2d 756 (1968) (the Maryland initial appearance is not a critical stage since nothing 
occurs that would restrict the accused's right to trial or affect him adversely at trial). 
16. 420 U.S. at 121-22; ABA·ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Com· 
mentary § 310 (1975). 
17. Prior to Gerstein only felons were entitled to a probable cause determination. See 
section I, infra. Now a determination of probable cause to detain is accorded all arrestees 
during the initial appearance. Administrative Directive to District Court of Maryland 
dated March 31, 1975.· 
18. [d. 
19. Misdemeanants, though currently receiving a determination of probable cause to detain 
pending trial, are denied a determination of probable cause to continue on to trial. See 
section II, infra. 
20. W. LA F AVE, ARREST, THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965) (Professor 
LaFave repeatedly notes that arrest by warrant is the exception rather than the rule in 
modern law enforcement procedure). See also State v. Williams, 117 N.J. Super. 372, 
285 A.2d 23 (1971) aff'd 59 N.J. 535, 284 A.2d 531 (1971) (warrants are rare in the 
case of narcotics offenses). 
21. Whether or not the requirements of reliability and particularity of the 
information on which an officer may act are more stringent where an arrest 
warrant is absent, they surely cannot be less stringent than where an arrest 
warrant is obtained. Otherwise, a principal incentive now existing for the 
procurement of arrest warrants would be destroyed. Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963). 
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arrests without a warrant, and thus without the prior approval of a 
judicial officer, even though there is adequate opportunity to obtain a 
warrant. 22 The Supreme Court recently upheld this policy approving 
warrantless arrests in United States u. Watson23 where it stated: 
[W]e decline to transform this judicial preference [for obtain-
ing a warrant prior to arrest] into a constitutional rule when the 
judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to 
authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather 
than to encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation 
with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether 
it was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect was 
about to flee, and the like.24 
The Court refused to require an officer to obtain a warrant prior to 
making an arrest even if a reasonable opportunity to secure a warrant 
existed. In Watson the arresting agents could have obtained a warrant as 
early as six days prior to the arrest.2S Watson placed no greater 
significance upon a warrant authorizing the seizure of a person than 
upon a warrant authorizing the seizure of personal property.26 
In view of the Supreme Court's sanction of warrantless arrests, a 
prompt determination of probable cause to detain is necessary to 
safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights of the accused. When a citizen 
Accord, Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). See also Jones v. United States, 
362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960); Hignut v. State, 17 Md. App. 399, 303 A.2d 173 (1973). 
22. W. LAFAVE, ARREST, THE DECISION TO TAKEA SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 15 (1965). 
23. United States v. Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. 4112 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976). 
24. [d. at 4116. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion noted that arrest probably 
constitutes a far more serious invasion of privacy than a search and seizure since no 
decision to release the suspect can come quickly enough to erase the invasion of privacy 
that already will have occurred. Then, typifying the majority's reasoning, Justice Powell 
continued: 
Logic therefore would seem to dictate that arrests be subject to the warrant 
requirement at least to the same extent as searches. 
But logic sometimes must defer to history and experience . ... There is no 
historical evidence that the framers or proponents of the Fourth Amendment, ... 
were at all concerned about warrantless arrests by local constables and other peace 
officers. [d. at 4117 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added). 
25. 44 U.S.L.W. 4112 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976). In Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 
(1948) the Court stated: 
The absence of a warrant of arrest, even though there was sufficient time to 
obtain one, does not destroy the validity of an arrest under these circumstances 
[felony committed in the presence of the arresting officer]. Warrants of arrest are 
designed to meet the dangers of unlimited and unreasonable arrests of persons 
who are not at the moment committing any crime. Those dangers, obviously, are 
not present where a felony plainly occurs before the eyes of an officer of the law 
at a place where he is lawfully present. Common sense then dictates that an arrest 
in that situation is valid despite the failure to obtain a warrant of arrest. [d. at 
705. 
The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure follows this policy. ABA-ALI 
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Commentary § 120.1(8) (1975). 
26. 44 U.S.L.W. 4112. 
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is arrested pursuant to a warrant, the magistrate has already decided 
that sufficient evidence exists to justify taking the suspect into custody 
and presenting him before a judicial officer to obtain his assurance of 
further appearance or detaining him pending a preliminary hearing or 
grand jury proceeding.27 When an arrest is made without a warrant, 
however, there has been no such judicial determination of probable 
cause. Unless the first appearance proceeding includes such a determina-
tion the arrestee may be unjustly held in custody for a substantial 
period of time. 
1. PRE-GERSTEIN PROCEDURE IN MARYLAND 
Prior to Gerstein it was common practice in Maryland and 
elsewhere28 for a magistrate29 in a criminal prosecution to set bail or 
send an accused to jail without determining whether the arresting 
officers had probable cause to believe the accused committed the crime 
with which he was charged. Maryland procedure required that anyone 
apprehended without a warrant be taken before a conveniently 
available judicial officer30 without unnecessary delay and in no event 
later than the earlier of twenty-four hours after arrest or the first 
session of court after the charging of the suspect. At the initial 
appearance the accused was provided with a copy of the charging 
document, informed of each offense with which he was charged, and 
told certain of his rights. 31 The commissioner then determined 
eligibility for pretrial release and set bail in accordance with Maryland 
District Rule 777.32 If an indigent defendant desired counsel, the 
commissioner notified either the public defender or the court. In the 
27. MD. DIST. RULE 706(c)(1) provides: 
[A]n arrest warrant shall be issued if it appears to the issuing officer upon 
application pursuant to Section a of this Rule that there is probable cause to 
believe that a crime has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. 
28. For an in-depth analysis of Federal procedure in this area see Note, Probable Cause at the 
Initial Appearance in Warrantless Arrests, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1128 (1972). 
29. Historically, a magistrate has been defined as "a public civil officer, possessing such 
power, legislative, executive or judicial, as the government appointing him may ordain 
[ or,] [i]n a narrow[ er] sense, an inferior judicial officer, such as a justice of the peace." 
Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1, 7 (1909). In Maryland the judicial officer is referred to 
as a commissioner rather than a magistrate. MD. ANN. CoDE. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., 
§ 2-607 (1974); see Administrative Directive to District Court of Maryland dated 
September 29, 1972. 
30. In Maryland a commissioner serves as the judicial officer. District Court commissioners 
are appointed by the Administrative Judge of each District with the approval of the 
Chief Judge of the District Court. Administrative Directive to District Court Commis-
sioners from the Chief Judge of the District Court of Maryland dated September 29, 
1972, at 1. 
31. MD. DIST. RULE 709(b)(3). The accused is informed of his right to consult with and be 
represented by a lawyer from the time the Charging Document is delivered to him and at 
all stages of the proceedings thereafter. He is also advised of his right to representation 
by a Public Defender if unable to afford a private attorney. 
32. MD. DIST. RULE 777(c) provides that any defendant charged with a non-capital offense 
be released on his personal recognizance pending trial, unless the commissioner thinks 
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case of a felony the judicial officer advised the arrestee of his right to a 
preliminary hearing, to determine probable cause to continue to trial, if 
requested within ten days.33 
Thus, before Gerstein a misdemeanant was denied any opportunity 
for a hearing to determine the reasonableness of the arrest. 34 The 
rationale for denying a hearing to misdemeanants was probably that, 
theoretically, higher standards apply to arrests without a warrant of 
misdemeanants than apply to warrantless arrests of felons. 35 The 
general rule is that a police officer may arrest without a warrant one 
that this type of release will not reasonably assure the accused's appearance at trial. 
Administrative Directive to District Court Commissioners from the Chief Judge of the 
District Court of Maryland dated September 29, 1972, at 21. See also United States v. 
Melville, 306 F. Supp. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
33. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 592 (Rep. vol. 1976); MD. DIST. RULE 709(f); MD. ANN. 
CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 4-304 (1974). See also United States v. Kelly, 285 A.2d 
694 (D.C.C. App. 1972); M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.C. App. 1971). 
34. The lack of justification for denying a hearing to a misdemeanant is particularly glaring 
in light of the fact that it is the amount of punishment that can be imposed that 
determines the class, felony or misdemeanor, not the punishment actually imposed. 
"[ I]t is well known that the actual punishment for many felonies is less harsh and severe 
than the penalties which may be inflicted in some misdemeanor cases." City of Piqua v. 
Hinger, 13 Ohio App. 2d 108, 112, 234 N.E.2d 321, 324 (1967) (emphasis added); see 
People v. Williams, 27 Cal. 2d 22, 163 P.2d 692 (1945); People v. Pryor, 17 Cal. App. 2d 
147,61 P.2d 773 (1936). 
In Maryland many misdemeanors carry penalties as great as those normally reserved 
for felonies, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 122A-1 (1957) (delivering to or receiving 
from a detainee money or anything of value carries a penalty of up to one-thousand 
dollars and up to three years imprisonment); Id. at § 139A (manufacturing, using or 
possessing a molotov cocktail carries a penalty of not more than one-thousand dollars 
and not more than three years imprisonment); Id. at § 174 (any officer or agent of a 
corporation who signs or assents to statements for the public or shareholders containing 
untruthful representations of its affairs, assets or liabilities is liable for a fine of 
one-thousand to ten-thousand dollars and six months to three years imprisonment); Id. 
at § 467 (receiving stolen goods worth under one-hundred dollars carries a penalty of 
not more than one-hundred dollars and up to eighteen months imprisonment); Id. at 
§ 464 (carnal knowledge of a female between fourteen to sixteen years of age carries a 
penalty of up to five-hundred dollars and up to two years imprisonment). 
35. The felony-misdemeanor classification is firmly entrenched in the criminal justice 
system. The common law felonies were murder, manslaughter, burglary, robbery, arson, 
rape, larceny, mayhem, sodomy and escape from a penal facility. 1 W. BURDICK, LAW OF 
CRIME 77 at § 77 (1946) cited in Note, Crime Classification and Its Effect on 
Constitutional Rights: An Analytical Approach, LAW & THE SOCIAL ORDER 492 n. 1 
(1970). The misdemeanor class simply encompasses all crimes other than felonies. Id. 
Today a majority of jurisdictions define a felony as a crime punishable by death or 
imprisonment in the state prison. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1975); ALA. CODE tit. 1, § 7 
(1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-401(e) (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.08 (Supp. 1975); 
IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-1-1-1 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 2-7 (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 687.2 (Supp. 1975); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.060 (1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 274 § 1 (1970); MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 28.197 (1970); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 1-3-11 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 556.020 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 193.120(2) (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:1 (Rep. vol. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 14-1 (Rep. vol. 1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.05 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 21 § 5 (1958); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-1-4 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-103 (Rep. vol. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-13 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 
§ 1 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-8 (Rep. vol. 1975); REV. CODE WASH. § 9.01.020 
(1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-1 (1966); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2 (1957). 
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believed by the arresting agent upon reasonable grounds to have been 
guilty of a felony and that he may only arrest without a warrant one 
guilty of a misdemeanor if committed in his presence. 36 In ascertaining 
whether a misdemeanor has been committed in the officer's presence, 
the term presence denotes that the commission of the offense is 
perceptible to the officer's senses, whether they be visual, auditory, or 
olfactory.37 This standard leaves room for error and, conceivably, an 
officer could be empowered to make a warrantless arrest for a 
misdemeanor with supposed probable cause, though the criminal act 
was not committed in his presence. 38 Despite the baseless nature of 
such an arrest the alleged misdemeanant would still be held or 
sentenced without a preliminary opportunity to refute the grounds for 
the arrest. 
The injustice of the dual standard is even more apparent when the 
reasons for the arrests are analyzed. The rule permitting warrantless 
arrests for felonies, as distinguished from misdemeanors, upon rea-
36. United States v. Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. 4112, 4114 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976); Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925); Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 534 (1900); 
Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 504-05 (1885). In Maryland see, Johnson v. State, 8 Md. 
App. 187, 259 A.2d 97 (1969); Winebrenner v. State, 6 Md. App. 440, 251 A.2d 610 
(1969); Robinson v. State, 4 Md. App. 515, 243 A.2d 879 (1968); Salmon v. State, 2 
Md. App. 513, 235 A.2d 758 (1967). See also Robinson v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 5 
Md. App. 68, 245 A.2d 407 (1968). For a list of state statutes prescribing the in presence 
requirement see ABA-ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE Appendix X 
(1975). 
Several state statutes expressly eliminate the necessity for a preliminary hearing in 
misdemeanor cases. See, e.g., State v. Watkins, 40 Wis. 2d 398, 162 N.W.2d 48 (1968); 
People v. Caldwell, 54 Misc. 2d 674, 283 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1967); Clark v. State, 417 
S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Cr. App. 1967). 
37. United States v. Brown, 463 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (reputation may combine with 
other factors to constitute probable cause); State v. Romonto, 190 Neb. 825, 212 
N.W.2d 641 (1973) (the odor of illegal drugs can provide probable cause to arrest). In 
Maryland see, Davids v. State, 208 Md. 377, 382-83, 118 A.2d 636, 638 (1955) (a crime 
is within an officer's presence if it is committed within his hearing and so near that he 
cannot be mistaken as to the offender); Johnson v. State, 8 Md. App. 187, 191, 259 
A.2d 97, 99 (1969) (arrest of person writing numbers on a brown paper bag for writing 
and possession of non-conventional lottery slip); Ramsey v. State, 5 Md. App. 563, 567, 
248 A.2d 659, 661 (1968) (officer sighted a bulge in suspect's coat indicating the 
presence of a gun); cf. Salmon v. State, 2 Md. App. 513, 235 A.2d 763 (1967). 
38. An arrest by a police officer or a private person for a misdemeanor or offense not 
committed "in their presence" violates no constitutional standard, state or 
federal. Several state statutes authorize such arrests for "past" misdemeanors. 
Lurie v. District Attorney of Kings County, 56 Misc. 68, 72, 288 N.Y.S.2d 256, 
261 (1968). 
For a list of states, including Maryland, which have statutes authorizing warrantless 
misdemeanor arrests even though the offense is not committed in the presence of the 
officer see, ABA-ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE Appendix X 1975. 
In Maryland see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 594(B) (Supp. 1974), listing crimes for which 
an officer may arrest without a warrant based on probable cause. These offenses include 
the burning of cribs, hay, corn, setting fire while perpetrating crime, carrying a weapon, 
destroying another's property, possession of hypodermic syringes, assault and specified 
attempts. Cuffia v. State, 14 Md. App. 521, 287 A.2d 319 (1972) (officer may base 
arrest on trustworthiness of information provided by an informer). 
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sonable belief, grew out of the need to protect the public safety by 
making prompt arrests. 39 
The reason for arrest for misdemeanors without warrant at 
common law was promptly to suppress breaches of the 
peace. . . while the reasons for arrest without a warrant on a 
reliable report of a felony was because the public safety and the 
due apprehension of criminals charged with heinous offenses 
required that such arrests should be made at once without 
warrant.40 
Denied the opportunity for a hearing, a misdemeanant faced harsher 
standards in attempting to avoid pretrial confinement, though his arrest 
usually did not involve guarding the public safety. Pre-Gerstein 
procedures in effect, rendered the law enforcement officer the final 
arbiter of probable cause since his decision was never questioned. 
The arresting officer's judgment was rarely subject to question even 
in the case of alleged felonies. Under the Maryland Rules an accused 
felon faced formidable barriers to receiving a determination of probable 
cause to proceed to trial. Election by the State's Attorney to charge the 
suspect by grand jury indictment abrogated any right to a preliminary 
hearing.41 The prosecutor generally arranged for the grand jury to meet 
before the date set for the preliminary examination.42 Complicating 
39. United States v. Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4114; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 
315-16 (1959) (dissenting opinion). Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1925). 
In Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281, 285 (1851) the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts noted that 
[t ]he public safety, and the due apprehension of criminals, charged with heinous 
offenses, imperiously require that such arrests should be made without warrant by 
officers of the law. 
40. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,157 (1925), 
41. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 592(3) (Rep. vol. 1976) provides: 
(3) If the state's attorney elects to charge the accused by grand jury indictment, 
the preliminary hearing is not a matter of right to the defendant but may be 
afforded in the court's discretion. 
See MD. DlsT. RULE 741(a)(2) and MD. DlsT. RULE 741(a)(3). See also Lem Woon v. 
Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913) (no right to a preliminary hearing prior to indictment); 
Rivera v. Gov't. of the Virgin Islands, 375 F.2d 988, 990 (3d Cir. 1967); Ferrell v. 
Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 241 Md. 432, 216 A.2d 740 (1966); Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 
524,207 A.2d 83 (1965). 
42. According to Professor Irving Younger of the Cornell University School of Law: 
Prosecutors have been successful in avoiding hearings; to my knowledge no 
defendant in a criminal case in the southern district of New York ever received a 
preliminary hearing .... If the defendant says that he does not wish to waive a 
preliminary hearing, the commissioner will set the hearing down for a date five or 
six days hence. If possible the prosecutor will simply obtain an indictment before 
the date for the preliminary hearing; the hearing then becomes moot. If, for 
whatever reason, the prosecutor cannot obtain an indictment within that time, he 
postpones the hearing. He may then obtain an indictment before the new date. If 
he fails to do so, he will adjourn the hearing again, and so on .... Hearings on S. 
3474, S. 945 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the 
Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 212 
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the problem was the fact that the arrestee was given the seemingly 
tempting option to elect an immediate trial. A request for immediate 
trial rarely insures being brought to trial with added speed but it does 
compel the arrestee to sacrifice his right to either a preliminary hearing 
or a grand jury indictment.43 Since a preliminary hearing to determine 
probable cause was not assured an arrestee in Maryland, new procedures 
to meet the standards imposed by Gerstein were mandated. 
II. THE EFFECT OF GERSTEIN ON MARYLAND PROCEDURE 
New procedures became effective in the District Court on Apri110, 
1975. These procedures supplement existing methods of dealing with 
the arrestee. In all warrantless arrests, including motor vehicle or 
natural resources cases in which the citizen is actually taken into 
custody, a probable cause determination is now made during the 
arrestee's initial appearance.44 Since the majority of arrests are made 
without a warrant45 the new procedures apply to most arrestees. 
Maryland is now faced with two probable cause determinations; the 
first testing the necessity for detention pending trial and the second 
reviewing the possible merits of continuing to trial. 
A. Stage One-The Initial Appearance 
During the initial appearance, both misdemeanants and felons receive 
a mandatory assessment of the validity of the present detention or 
restraint.46 This addition to Maryland procedure can be termed the 
Gerstein proceeding. The Gerstein proceeding focuses on the legality of 
the arrest and the concentration is upon the factual, as opposed to the 
legal, guilt or innocence of the accused.47 Its purpose is, apparently, to 
(1967), quoted in Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in Warrantless 
Arrests, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1128, 1131 n. 11 (1972). 
Defense attorneys generally consider the preliminary hearing the preferred means 
of determining probable cause. Opponents of the grand jury system assert that the 
prosecutor dominates the grand jury's actions to the extent that it has become a mere 
rubber stamp for him. According to several critics, the prosecution may press for the 
result it desires so strongly as to render the grand jury unable to make an intelligent, 
independent determination of probable cause. Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury 
Indictment in fllinois, 1966 ILL. L.E. 423, 432-33 (1966); Moley, The Institution of 
Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment or Information, 29 MICH. L. REV. 403, 414-15 
(1931); Tigar & Levy, The Grand Jury as the New Inquisition, 50 MICH. ST. B.J. 693 
(1971); Note, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge, and Undue 
Influence, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 761,766 n. 29 (1972). Contra, R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S 
PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES 1634·1941 (1963). 
43. MD. RULE 709. This rule creates the interesting situation of compelling an arrestee to 
forfeit one constitutional right, a grand jury hearing, for another, a speedy trial. 
44. Administrative Directive to District Court Commissioners from the Chief Judge of the 
District Court of Maryland dated March 31, 1975. 
45. See note 20 supra. 
46. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 315 (D.C.C. App. 1971). 
47. The distinction between factual guilt and legal guilt refers to the difference 
between those persons who are "guilty" of committing the proscribed act but are 
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ferret out illegal detentions which usually fall into three basic 
categories: first, where the arrest, though made in good faith, was 
nevertheless illegal; second, where the arrest was knowingly illegal; and, 
lastly, where the arrest was legal when made but subsequent events 
indicate that the suspect should no longer be detained. The value of 
promptly detecting illegal arrests lies both in preventing continued 
unjustified detention and in deterring future illegal police conduct. 48 
Since "[t]he sole issue [in a Gerstein proceeding] is whether 
probable cause exists for detaining the arrested person pending further 
proceedings, ,,49 the Supreme Court deemed an adversary hearing after 
warrantless arrests unnecessary. 50 Pr~of of reasonable grounds for 
believing a crime was being committed need not be evidence admissible 
at trial. 51 The lesser consequences of ascertaining probable cause do 
not "require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a 
reasonable doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and 
credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the 
evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. ,,52 Because of its limited 
function the initial appearance is not considered a critical stage 
mandating counsel.53 The arresting officer submits a statement, 54 
under oath, to a district court commissioner at the time of the 
arrestee's initial appearance. The standard applied by the commissioner 
in determining probable cause is identical to that utilized in issuing 
pre-arrest warrants or summonses.55 Neither the officer nor the 
nevertheless found "innocent" by the criminal justice system because the police, 
prosecutor, or judiciary have violated certain of the defendant's legal rights, and 
those who are both "guilty" of the proscribed act and are found "guilty" by the 
criminal justice system. Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal 
Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771, 776 (1974). 
48. See United States v. Quinn, 357 F. Supp. 1348, 1351·52 (N.D. Ga. 1973). For a 
complete discussion of the nature of this type of hearing see, Note, The Function of the 
Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771 (1974). 
49. 420 U.S. at 120; see Administrative Directive to District Court Commissioners from the 
Chief Judge of the District Court of Maryland dated March 31, 1975. 
50. Id. 
51. Proof of reasonable grounds could encompass inferences from suspicious acts, e.g., 
consort with known drug dealers, the surreptitious passing of a package or an intercepted 
message suggestive of criminal activities. See People v. Rios, 46 Cal. 2d 297, 294 P.2d 39 
(1956). See also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (dissenting opinion). 
52. 420 U.S. at 121. 
53. Id.; MD. DlsT. RULE 709 prescribes the procedure followed at the initial appearance and 
does not require any of the protections normally accompanying a critical stage. See 
Administrative Directive to District Court Commissioners from the Chief Judge of the 
District Court of Maryland dated March 31, 1975. 
54. District Court Form CR 704. A Statement of Charges is used only in situations where the 
accused has already been arrested by a law enforcement officer, without an arrest 
warrant, and is in the custody of the officer at the time the Statement of Charges is 
presented to the commissioner. Only a law enforcement officer may file a Statement of 
Charges. See Moaney v. Maryland, Md. App. , 346 A.2d 466 (1975); Administra· 
tive Directive to District Court Commissioners from the Chief Judge of the District Court 
of Maryland dated September 29, 1972, at 14-15. 
55. The information submitted to the commissioner issuing a warrant must be sufficient to 
enable him to make an independent evaluation of whether probable cause exists. See 
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arrestee need be present at this hearing and it need not be evidentiary in 
nature. If the commissioner finds reasonable grounds for detention he 
so indicates on the Statement of Charges and continues with the normal 
processing of the arrested citizen.56 "If, however, the commissioner 
determines that 'probable cause' does not exist, he shall so indicate on 
the Statement of Charges, complete all normal processing of the 
arrestee, and then release him on his own recognizance pending 
trial. "57 When the commissioner decides whether the factual situation 
justifies taking the accused into custody, he refrains from passing 
judgment on the validity of the legal charges. The Gerstein proceeding 
permits a suspect the liberty to continue his daily activities with a 
semblance of normalcy pending trial but affords no means of avoiding 
continued criminal proceedings. 
Undeniably, the Gerstein proceeding will lead to better arrests, since 
the officer's rationale will be subjected to prompt judicial scrutiny. 
Thus, the arresting agent's reasons for detaining a citizen must be 
expressed more clearly than ever before. As the Court noted in Johnson 
v. United States: 58 
The point of the Fourth Amendment which often is not grasped 
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the 
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw 
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those 
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 59 
A decision to arrest without a warrant is faced initially not in the 
courtroom but at the scene of the arrest where the totality of the 
circumstances facing the officer is weighed against his split-second 
decision to make the arrest.60 The standard set by the Constitution and 
by the interpretation of the Court is one that will protect both the 
officer and the citizen, for if the officer acts with probable cause he is 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
These cases held that a warrant could be based upon hearsay where the informant was 
reliable and the warrant was obtained in a manner justifying reliance upon it; or the 
number and precision of details furnished or corroborating evidence justify reliance. 
Although these were search cases, the Court has on occasion cited search cases to explain 
its meaning in arrest cases. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). See also Administrative 
Directive to District Court Commissioners from the Chief Judge of the District Court of 
Maryland dated September 29, 1972 at 5-13. 
56. Administrative Directive to District Court Commissioners from the Chief Judge of the 
District Court of Maryland dated March 31, 1975. 
57. ld. 
58. 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
59. ld. at 13-14, quoted in 420 U.S. at 112·13. 
60. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 499 (1963). 
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protected from civil suit for false arrest even though the citizen is 
innocent. 61 
The Fourth Amendment also rejects the notion that executive 
officers of the government can function as neutral and disinterested 
magistrates since unreviewed executive discretion could yield too 
readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and to overlook 
potential invasions of privacy and protected speech.62 An impartial 
decision maker is essential63 to protect against abridgment of the 
Fourth Amendment by warrantless arrests on less than probable cause, 
the resulting pendency of prosecution being the evil to be avoided. The 
magistrate is an impartial arbiter. His examination stands as a safeguard 
to insure that the defendant will not be held in custody without 
probable cause. 64 
Nevertheless, the efficacy of the Gerstein proceeding is highly 
suspect. While the examination at the initial appearance grants freedom 
from incarceration to arrestees found taken into custody without 
probable cause to detain, it compels potential detainees to face judicial 
evaluation without counsel, a right of confrontation or even a right to 
be present. 6S It is at this early stage that key discretionary decisions are 
made, such as whether to charge the arrestee and what crimes are to be 
charged. Whether the accused is free affects his ability to aid in 
preparing his defense and to make a good record for himself in 
anticipation of sentencing. The Gerstein Court chose to overlook the 
principle that a fundamental requisite of due process of law is the 
opportunity to be heard.66 The Court itself has held that the right to 
be heard implies that the hearing take place at "a meaningful time and 
in a meaningful manner. ,,67 When a person is denied the right to be 
represented by counsel, as well as the right to be present at his own 
hearing, it can scarcely be said that he is receiving a meaningful 
appraisal of probable cause. 
B. Stage Two-The Preliminary Hearing 
The second probable cause determination is implemented during the 
preliminary hearing and existed before the Court's decision in Ger-
61. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Maghan v. 
Jerome, 88 F.2d 1001, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Pritchett v. Sullivan, 182 F. 480,482 (8th 
Cir. 1910); see Ravenscroft v. Casey, 139 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1944). 
62. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972). 
63. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 
(1955); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33,45-46 (1950). 
64. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 481·82 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,270 (1960); United States v. 
Quinn, 357 F. Supp. 1343, 1351 (N.D. Ga. 1973); 8 J. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
§ 3.02(2) (2d ed. 1971). 
65. Administrative Directive to District Court Commissioners from the Chief Judge of the 
District Court of Maryland dated March 31, 1975, at 3. 
66. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). 
67. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
1976] Pretrial Detention 335 
stein. 68 During this stage the major concern is whether there is a 
sufficient probability of conviction at trial to merit further proceed-
ings. 69 Those cases for which such a probability does not exist are 
screened out; the perspective is forward toward trial as opposed to 
backward toward arrest. The inquiry centers on legal, rather than· 
factual, guilt or innocence, thereby protecting the interests of the 
accused in avoiding further unnecessary proceedings. The judicial role 
at this stage entails weighing and judgment rather than a wooden 
comparison of the charge sheet and testimonial with the elements of 
the crime. The type of examination employed in the preliminary 
hearing serves as a safeguard for the accused by shielding him against 
unfounded charges. 70 
The Supreme Court requires adversary procedures in inquiries, such 
as Maryland's preliminary hearing, that determine whether the evidence 
justifies charging the accused with the offense. 71 In Maryland an 
arrested citizen has the right to counsel during the preliminary 
hearing.72 The benefits to be derived from this right are substantially 
decreased due to the restrictions placed upon the attorney's actions 
during the hearing. Because the preliminary examination is not a critical 
stage of the proceedings 73 the defense may not present its case, offer 
68. See note 33 supra. 
69. For an in-depth analysis of the benefits derived from this type of hearing see, Note, The 
Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771 
(1974). See also F. MILLER, PROSECUTION, at 87-88,101-02,348 (1969). 
70. Weinberg & Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation to Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: 
An Analysis of Section 303 of the Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 
1368-70 (1969); Note, The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IOWA L. REV. 
164, 165-67 (1965). It is important to note, however, that the function of the 
preliminary hearing is not simply to give advantages to the defendant as against the state. 
The issue is not giving "advantages" to either "side" in the struggle between 
prosecutors and defendants, but rather the degree to which the system should 
avoid convicting, incarcerating, or otherwise disturbing the innocent accused .... 
In any event, ... there seems to be no disadvantage to the "peace forces" in 
ending the incarceration of an individual who cannot be proven guilty. Note, The 
Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 
771,784 n. 60 (1974). 
See also, DeToro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 
(1964); Williams v. State, 214 Md. 143. 132 A.2d 605 (1957). 
71. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 122-23; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); White v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (absence of counsel for petitioner when he entered a plea 
of guilty before a magistrate violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In this instance Maryland's preliminary hearing was deemed a 
critical stage of the proceedings). 
72. MD. DIST. RULE 709(b)(3). The accused is entitled to representation by counsel from the 
time the Charging Document is delivered to him and at all stages of the proceedings 
thereafter. 
73. DeToro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964). 
Emphasizing the limited function of the preliminary hearing the Court of Special 
Appeals stated in Perkins v. State, 26 Md. App. 526, 529, 339 A.2d 360, 363 (1975), 
that Maryland has always been in accord with the Rutz rule that 
the discharge of an accused person upon a preliminary examination for want of 
probable cause constitutes no bar to a subsequent preliminary examination before 
another magistrate. Such an examination is not a trial in any sense and does not 
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evidence or cross-examine witnesses. What remains is a forum for 
presentation of the State's case. 74 Several states, however, allow a full 
examination and commentators have noted that a complete adversary 
hearing is the preferred means of determining probable cause to try a 
suspect. 75 
The Maryland preliminary examination at least offers the defense an 
opportunity to discover elements of the prosecution's case, and allows 
the prosecutor to test the substance of his case before expending 
additional time and effort. In addition, when the preliminary hearing 
discloses a lack of probable cause, the accused is released and charges 
are dropped. As a consequence of the somewhat higher standards 
imposed by the preliminary hearing and its forward-looking orientation 
the accused has a greater chance to escape the anxiety, humiliation, and 
stigma of an unjustified public accusation and prosecution, as well as to 
avoid the expense and inconvenience of the trial. 76 While the Gerstein 
hearing is now applied to all arrestees the forward-looking preliminary 
hearing with its added protections was not mandated by Gerstein and 
applied only to a limited class of alleged felons. 77 
III. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS 
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit deprivations of 
liberty by the states without due process of law. Courts have held that 
operate to put the defendant in jeopardy. U.S. ex rei. Rutz v. Levy, 268 U.S. 390, 
393 (1925); see Note, The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IOWA L. 
REV. 164 (1965). Failure to hold a preliminary hearing is not ground for post 
conviction relief. Ferrell v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 241 Md. 432, 435, 216 
A.2d 740, 743 (1966); State ex rei. Sanner v. Warden, 191 Md. 743, 744, 59 A.2d 
762, 763 (1948); Sykes v. Warden, 201 Md. 662, 663,93 A.2d 549, 550 (1953); 
State ex rei. Cave v. Superintendent, 198 Md. 675, 676, 81 A.2d 461, 462 (1951); 
Harnett v. Warden, 194 Md. 727, 728, 71 A.2d 303, 304 (1951); cf. Pritchard v. 
Warden, 209 Md. 662, 121 A.2d 696 (1956). 
74. This procedure has been criticized for its non-evidentiary nature. In 1949 the Attorney 
General of Maryland expressed the opinion that the right to cross·examine the State's 
witnesses at the preliminary hearing was a fundamental right guaranteed an accused by 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 34 Opinions of the Attorney General of Maryland, 
No. 137 (1949); see DeToro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 909 (1964). On variations in state law regarding preliminary hearings see, 
McIntyre & Lippman, Prosecutors and Early Disposition of Felony Cases, 56 A.B.A.J. 
1154, 1155·57 (1970); McIntyre, A Study of Judicial Dominance of the Charging 
Process, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 463 (1968). 
In England, from the very beginning of the modern adversary preliminary hearing 
the accused, like the Crown, could call as witnesses anyone "who shall know anything 
relating to the Facts and Circumstances of the Case." 30 & 31 Viet. c.35 § 3. The 
accused could also call anyone who knew "anything tending to prove the Innocence of 
such accused Person." Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 725, 727 n. 2 (1964). 
75. Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE 
L.J. 771 (1974). 
76. See Jones v. Super. Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 660, 667·68, 483 P.2d 1241, 1245-46, 94 Cal. Rptr. 
289, 293·94 (1971); Myers v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819, 822·25 (Mass. 1973); 
Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 103, 198 N.W. 539,541 (1922); Note, The Function of the 
Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771, 784 (1974). 
77. See note 33 supra. 
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not every deprivation qualifies for the protection of procedural due 
process. 78 Due process is flexible and requires different procedural 
protections for different situations. Whether procedural protections are 
to be extended depends upon the extent to which a person will be 
"condemned to suffer grievous loss"79 and whether the recipient's 
interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in 
summary adjudication.80 The deprivation resulting from a decision to 
hold an accused for trial is normally loss of liberty. This is universally 
recognized as a very serious deprivation; in fact, freedom from 
incarceration constitutes one of the clearest examples of an interest 
protected by due process.81 
By limiting themselves to the question of probable cause warranting 
detention the Court, in Gerstein, failed to award the arrestee a proper 
forum to present his case and remove it from the judicial system at an 
early stage. Arguably, even those who obtain their freedom from the 
state penal institutions pending trial still suffer a certain loss of liberty 
caused by pretrial release restraints on movement and association and 
78. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (application of due process turns not 
merely upon the weight of the interest, but whether the interest is within the 
contemplation of liberty or property under the Fourteenth Amendment); accord, Board 
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570·71 (1972) (nontenured teacher's interest in 
renewal of his contract is neither liberty or property). But see Graham v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (rejection of the concept that constitutional rights tum upon 
whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a right or as a privilege); Warden, Md. 
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (dissenting opinion) (the principal 
object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property). See 
also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,80-81 (1972) (a state law authorizing the seizure of 
goods and chattels in a person's possession or a writ of replevin without a prior hearing 
violates procedural due process). 
79. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (concurring 
opinion), quoted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). 
80. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (defendant is entitled to be present at a 
bail determination hearing); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886, 895 (1961). The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a 
hearing prior to deprivation of certain liberties: Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 
(1972) (dismissal of professor); Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) 
(dismissal of professor); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin); Bell v. Burson, 
402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare 
benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969) 
(garnishment). But see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (temporary suspension of 
high school student). See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440-42 (1960). 
81. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 
251 (1891) (before the state may deprive an individual of his liberty, an interest of 
transcending value, it must comply with the demands of due process); see Brenneman v. 
Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 142 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (it is a violation of due process to 
subject a pretrial detainee to restrictions other than those inhering in the confinement 
itself or justified by compelling necessities of the institution's administration); cf. Bell v. 
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of an uninsured motorist's license and 
registration after involvement in an accident without first assessing the possibility of 
judgment being rendered against him is a deprivation of due process); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process prohibits a state from denying, solely 
because of inability to pay court costs and fees, access to its courts to individuals seeking 
judicial dissolution of their marriage); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due 
process precludes suspension of welfare payments without a prior hearing). 
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the continued weight of pending litigation. Public accusation of 
criminal activity has serious consequences even on a free defendant; 82 
indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged these consequences as an 
incarceration of sortS.83 Arrest may seriously interfere with an 
accused's liberty, whether he is incarcerated or not, "disrupt his 
employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, 
subject him to the public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family 
and his friends. ,,84 
Freedom from incarceration can have a major effect on the outcome 
of the accused's trial.85 Pretrial detention impedes preparation for trial, 
and mounting evidence supports the belief that it has a positive effect 
on the probability of receiving a prison sentence upon conviction or 
receiving a longer prison sentence than would be imposed in the 
absence of pretrial detention.86 As time passes between arrest and trial 
"evidence and witnesses disappear, memories fade, and events lose their 
perspective. ,,87 An additional consequence of being bound over for 
trial is that the arrestee suffers complete lack of mobility and denial of 
82. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (arrest constitutes a public act that 
may seriously interfere with the accused's liberty whether he is free on bail or not); see, 
e.g., Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 725, 727-28 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (the accused is 
entitled to his liberty unless the government can establish probable cause for his 
detention through procedures which accord with the concept of fair process); Thies v. 
State, 178 Wis. 98, 103, 189 N.W. 539, 541 (1922) (the purpose of the preliminary 
hearing is to protect the accused from open and public accusations of crime, and to spare 
him the humiliation and anxiety involved in public trial); Note, The Function of the 
Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771, 784 n. 62 (1974); 
Note, Preliminary Examination-Evidence and Due Process, 15 KAN. L. REv. 374, 
385-86 (1967). But cf United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1965) (a requirement 
of unreasonable speed in bringing an accused to trial would have a deleterious effect both 
upon the rights of the accused and the right of society to protect itself); Smith v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 1,10 (1959) (the essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere 
speed); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957) (whether delay in completing 
a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon the 
surrounding circumstances). 
83. United States v. Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. 4112, 4122 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976) (No. 74·538) 
(dissenting opinion): 
[a]n unjustified arrest that forces the individual temporarily to forfeit his right to 
control his person and movements and interrupts the course of his daily business 
may be more intrusive than an unjustified search. See ABA-ALI MODEL CODE OF 
PRE.ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Commentary § 120 (1975). 
84. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). See also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 
374, 379 (1969) (outstanding criminal charge can have as depressive an effect on a 
person at large as on a prisoner); Klopfer v. State, 386 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1967) 
(petitioner, a university professor, contended that pendency of an indictment interfered 
with his professional activities and travel). 
85. Note, A Constitutional Right to Preliminary Hearings for All Pretrial Detainees, 48 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 158, 165 (1974); see Kasanof & Single, The Unconstitutional Administra-
tion of Bail: Bellamy v. The Judges of New York City, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 459, 462 
(1972); Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641 (1964). 
86. Id.; Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 
YALE L.J. 767, 769 (1968); Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II, 113 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1125, 1137-51 (1965); Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A 
Statistical Study, Forward, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631 (1964). 
87. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 380 (1969). 
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the opportunity to earn a living for himself and his family. 88 A person 
isolated in jail is powerless to exert has own investigative efforts to 
mitigate the corrosive effects of the passage of time, whereas a 
defendant ·who is released pending trial is in a far better position to 
actively and effectively participate in his defense.89 
Another major consideration in pretrial detention is the condition of 
the facility in which the accused will be held. The purposes of pretrial 
and post-conviction incarceration are fundamentally different. Impri-
sonment prior to trial 
[i]s only for safe custody and not for punishment: therefore, in 
this dubious interval between the commitment and trial, a 
prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity, and 
neither be loaded with needless fetters, or subjected to other 
hardships than such as are absolutely requisite for the purpose 
of confinement only .... 90 
In determining the function of pretrial detention the court must look 
to the purpose which the deprivation serves in practice,91 not in 
theory. It is consistent with the due process requirement that a 
presumptively innocent man's right to personal mobility be curtailed 
only to the extent warranted by the State's interest in confining him. 92 
Unconstitutionality is established if the real aims prove to be the 
punitive ones of retribution and deterrence.93 Obviously, any depriva-
88. Kasanof & Single, The Unconstitutional Administration of Bail: Bellamy v. The Judges 
of New York City, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 459,462 (1972); Note, A Constitutional Right to 
Preliminary Hearings for All Pretrial Detainees, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 158,164 (1974). See 
also Note, Evidence and Due Process 15 KAN. L. REv. 374,376 (1967) (binding over for 
trial may result in irreparable harm to the accused's reputation, regardless of the ultimate 
outcome of the subsequent trial); Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: 
Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 664,701 (1961) (reporting on 
the damage to reputation inflicted by an unconstitutional search for criminal evidence, 
damage inflicted by this kind of invasion is magnified considerably when an individual is 
actually incarcerated because of alleged criminal activity). 
89. Among the theories advanced to explain the tendency of released individuals to fare 
better at trial are the detainee's inability to contribute money and labor to investigations 
for his defense; the detainee's inability to locate witnesses and evidence peculiarly 
accessible to him; difficulties of contact with counsel; and the impact on judge and jury 
of prison pallor and the demeanor which a period in jail may produce. D. FREED & P. 
WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES, 45-48 (1964). But see Hodgdon v. United States, 365 
F.2d 679, 686-87 (8th Cir. 1966) (the defendant contended unsuccessfully that pretrial 
detention interfered with preparation for trial). 
90. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300, quoted in Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 
128, 136-37 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1972); accord, Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 100 
(N.D. Ohio 1971). 
91. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 636-37 (1960) (dissenting opinion). 
92. Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400, 401 (2d Cir. 1975) (the incarceration of indigent 
detainees unable to make bail violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 
676,688 (D. Mass. 1973). 
93. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). 
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tion of liberty is, in reality, a form of punishment. In the case of 
pretrial detainees, however, this aspect of incarceration should be 
minimized to conform to the underlying purpose of the detention. The 
only legitimate purpose behind incarcerating those who are accused of 
crime is to guarantee their presence at trial.94 Where incarceration is 
imposed prior to conviction, deterrence, punishment, and retribution 
are not legitimate functions of the incarcerating officials. Their role is 
but a temporary holding operation, and their necessary freedom of 
action is concomitantly diminished. "Punitive measures in such a 
context are out of. harmony with the presumption of innocence." 95 
Nevertheless, detainees are usually held in jails which are remnants of 
the nineteenth century ,96 when more retributive penal theories 
dictated harsh conditions.97 Cells tend to be crowded, heating and 
lighting are inadequate, and the sanitary facilities primitive. The 
detainee may be placed alongside addicts, alcoholics and persons 
accused of more dangerous crimes.98 The presumptively innocent man 
is forced to linger in these conditions for months prior to tria1.99 
The irony of the situation of pretrial detainees is apparent. Their 
condition should be of relatively slight concern to the law because the 
detention is so temporary. Under the Sixth Amendment they enjoy the 
"right to a speedy trial"loo and presumably in the near future they will 
94. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 688 (D. Mass. 1973); 
see note 90 supra. 
95. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 P.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1971) quoted in Brenneman v. 
Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 136 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
363 (1970); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
96. See, Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE 
L.J. 941 (1970) (for a vivid description of jail conditions in the United States). See also 
Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973); 
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. 
Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio, 1971). 
97. During the last few years the Jail Programming and Inspection Officer, MD. ANN. CODE, 
art. 27 § 704 (1957), has recommended that as many as twelve local jails be closed due 
to failure to meet minimum standards. These facilities were described as antiquated with 
"highly impersonal and authoritarian approaches to the persons confined." 3 REPORT OF 
THE MARYLAND COMMISSION ON THE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT, 62-63 (1975). Most local 
jails are administered by the Sheriff who may also have to perform police related 
activities as well as service the courts. It is generally believed by correction officials that 
an effective job cannot be done in the area of correction if it is necessary to devote part 
of the time to another major function. The Sheriff's staff tends to be small and relatively 
few staff members have had any training in the area of corrections. With rare exceptions, 
programs of any type are virtually non-existent. Even medical care is not always provided 
in-house. When such services are available it is generally on a limited basis. Id. at 63-86. 
98. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 688 (D. Mass. 1973); 
see note 70 supra. 
99. ADMINISTRATIVE CLERK OF THE COURT, ANNUAL REPORT, 1973-1974 at 53 (1974); see 
Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400, 402 (2d Cir. 1975) (the court found that inmates at the 
Brooklyn House of Detention could be incarcerated for as long as forty-five days 
awaiting indictment on a felony charge). 
100. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI reads: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the n"ght to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
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move along, either to prison after conviction or to freedom after 
acquittal. Too often this happens in the far future. 101 The plight of 
pretrial detainees has generated considerable debate in recent years over 
the causes and effects of the significant delay in the American criminal 
justice system between arrest and trial. 102 Even in the infrequent case 
of a citizen detained only a brief time awaiting trial it is significant to 
note that "[t]he Constitution draws no distinction between loss of 
liberty for a short period and such loss for a long one. »103 
Being arrested and held by the police, even for a few hours, is, 
for most persons, awesome and frightening. Unlike other 
occasions on which one may be authoritatively required to be 
somewhere or do something, an arrest abruptly subjects a 
person to constraint, and removes him to unfamiliar and 
threatening surroundings.... The security of the individual 
requires that so abrupt and intrusive an authority be granted to 
public officials only on a guarded basis. 104 
A prompt determination of probable cause would spare a presumptively 
innocent person extended confinement while awaiting trial. The 
pendency of the trial will almost certainly force curtailment of the 
accused's speech, associations and participation in unpopular 
causes. lOS Gerstein gave the Court the opportunity to grant arrestees a 
full probable cause determination on the merits of the charge. The 
Court elected to bypass this chance in favor of a procedure offering less 
protection than is afforded a public school student suspension. 106 
Under Maryland's application of the perfunctory hearing, previously 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. [Emphasis added] . 
See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) (innovation of the speedy trial 
right need not await indictment, information or other charge, but begins with the actual 
restraints imposed by arrest). 
101. See note 72 supra. 
102. E.g., Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 
YALE L.J. 771 (1974); see Hearings on S. 754 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1·10, 109·31, 14~, 
154-64 (1973); ct. President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 80·96 (1967). 
103. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
104. ABA·ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Commentary § 120.1 at 
290-91 (1975), quoted in United States v. Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4122-23 (dissenting 
opinion). 
105. See Klopfer v. State, 386 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1967). 
106. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 127 (dissenting opinion); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970) (a full adversary hearing is required before termination of welfare benefits); see 
Note, A Constitutional Right to Preliminary Hearings for All Pretrial Detainees, 48 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 158 (1974). 
342 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 5 
described as the Gerstein hearing,107 an accused may find it difficult, if 
not impossible, to reap much advantage from the prompt determination 
of probable cause to detain, thus, avoiding unnecessary confinement in 
substandard accomodations. "A less-than-probable-cause arrest fol-
lowed by a Gerstein release is as offensive to the Fourth Amendment as 
a less-than-probable-cause-search that fails to uncover the evidence 
sought .... ,,108 The fact tl1at an unjustified intrusion into a citizen's 
sphere of personal privacy has occurred is not extinguished by the 
Gerstein proceeding. The Fourth Amendment violation is actually 
aggravated by the fact that even though the magistrate admits the lack 
of justification for the arrest by his no probable cause determination, 
the citizen is still bound over for trial, further infringing upon his right 
to be left alone. 
Probably the only means of fully guarding a person's rights is "by 
requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to any 
arrest .... "109 Since the Supreme Court, however, now gives complete 
approval to warrantless arrests, the states will probably have to develop 
procedures to mitigate the effects of indefensible arrests. If warrantless 
arrests are to remain a fact of life then the suspect taken into custody 
without probable cause should have the opportunity to eXCUlpate 
himself as quickly as possible. 
IV. A COMPROMISE-MODEL CODE 
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 
One possibility for fairly and rapidly determining the sufficiency of 
probable cause and terminating the case at an early stage is the 
procedure recommended by the American Law Institute's Model Code 
of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. [hereinafter referred to as the Code]. 
The Gerstein Court gave tacit approval to the first judicial appearance 
procedure of the Code's Article 310, citing it as an example of "other 
ways of testing probable cause for detention.""o 
A. The First Appearance 
Under Article 310 the first appearance is divided in two sessions 
where the' accused is in custody.lll Within twenty-four hours" 2 the 
arrestee would appear before a judicial officer" 3 who would "(i) in-
107. See section II, A supra. 
108. United States v. Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4123 (dissenting opinion). 
109. 420 U.S. at 113 (dictum); see United States v. Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4123. 
110. 420 U.S. at 124 n. 25. 
111. Compare ABA·ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE.ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 310.1 (1975) with 
ld. § 310.2(2). 
112. ABA·ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE·ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 310.1 (1975). 
113. ld. at Commentary § 310.1 at 579. The Code requirement that the neutral and detached 
officer be a judge compensated on a salary or per diem basis comports with 
developments in many states and in Federal practice. The rule denies justices of the 
peace and other fee collecting judicial officials jurisdiction to conduct ~he first 
appearance. 
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form him about the complaint, (ii) warn him of his rights, (iii) tempo-
rarily fix conditions of release, and (iv) arrange for counsel. ,,114 The 
arrestee would not normally question probable cause during the first 
session but he could do so, in which case the procedures employed 
during the second session would be followed. I IS 
Forty-eight hours later the accused would again appear before the 
judicial officer. During the second phase of the initial appearance 
conditions for release would be set and reasonable cause to hold for 
trial would be initially determined on the basis of the complaint and 
testimony or sworn written statements by the arresting agents or 
witnesses. The state would only be required to present testimony if 
called upon to do so by the magistrate.1l6 
Since Gerstein determined that the examination of probable cause to 
detain is not a "critical stage" of the proceedings, the Code does not 
require the presence of counsel during the initial appearance. Although 
counsel is not mandated, the commentary to the Code highly 
recommends that 
[e ]ven if there is not a constitutional right to counsel at the 
first appearance, as a matter of policy it is wise to assure that 
the defendant is represented at the first appearance. At the first 
appearance the judge is required to determine whether there 
exists reasonable cause to support the complaint and to fix bail 
or other pre-trial release conditions, both of which decisions are 
critical to the defendant's securing his immediate freedom and 
require representation and advocacy. Representation by counsel 
is particularly important to the indigent defendant who cannot 
post more than the most nominal bail. I 17 
The Code recognizes that the effective participation of defense 
counsel is critical to the accused's rights and to assurance of rational 
decision-making. The draftsmen recognized that even non-indigents 
could experience difficulty securing an attorney on the short notice 
necessitated by the initial appearance. In order to assure the prompt 
implementation of the defendant's rights the Code recommends that 
the court assign defense counsel even though the defendant may not be 
indigent.1l8 "[I]f it turns out that the defendant has funds to obtain 
counsel he may be required to pay a moderate fee to reimburse the 
court for the services rendered to him.,,1l9 The attorney appointed at 
this stage would remain with the accused as his representative only 
114. [d. at 578. 
115. [d. 
116. See note 74 supra. 
117. ABA-ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Commentary § 310.1, 581 
(1975). 
118. [d. at 583. 
119. [d. 
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during the initial appearance after which private counselor a public 
defender would have to be retained. 
B. The Screening Conference 
Article 320 of the Code provides for a screening conference between 
the parties. The conference is discretionary on the part of the 
defendant and 
[C]reates a statutory framework to encourage and guide the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in determining whether and 
what to charge; whether to decline prosecution unconditionally, 
or on the condition that the defendant abstain from any further 
illegal acts or that he participate in some rehabilitation program; 
and whether to agree to sentencing concessions in connection 
with a plea of guilty. The conference is designed as an 
opportunity for the parties to exchange information about the 
case in order to provide a basis for possible agreement on 
disposition of the case at this point. 120 
A screening conference may be held either before or after the 
preliminary hearing leaving to the defense the tactical decision as to the 
order of the two proceedings. The conference is an adversary procedure 
requiring the presence of defense counsel. The draftsmen believed that 
the chances of an accused being misled, or believing he was, when 
negotiating with the prosecutor are too great to forego defense 
counsel. 121 
C. The Preliminary Hearing 
Finally, Article 330122 provides for a preliminary hearing to be held 
within ten days if the accused is in custody and thirty days if he is not, 
with provision for limited adjournments. Since the function of the 
hearing is to screen out charges that should not go to trial more 
evidence is required to prove probable cause than is required for an 
arrest and detention. The judge need hot be persuaded of the arrestee's 
guilt but should consider the case as if it were a trial and he were 
120. Id. at Commentary § 320, 584·85. 
121. Id. at 585-88. 
122. Section 330.1 provides in part: 
(1) Right to a Hearing. If the crime charged in the complaint is a [felony 1, 
the defendant shall have a right to a preliminary hearing to determine whether 
there is sufficient evidence to proceed to trial. The filing of an indictment by the 
grand jury charging the defendant with the same or a related offense shall not 
terminate his right to a preliminary hearing .... 
Felony is in brackets since it is at this point that the states must elect whether they wish 
to distinguish as to procedures for the preliminary hearings. The draftsmen appear to 
favor one procedure for all accused. 
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required to rule on the sufficiency of the evidence to send the case to 
the jury. 123 
The Code recognizes that a grand jury indictment is not a fair 
substitute for a preliminary hearing. 
Preliminary inquiries can on occasion have great value for one 
charged with crime. Where a defendant is denied out of hand 
the opportunity to consider utilizing that value, we do not 
think that that denial is to be swept under the rug of a grand 
jury indictment. Neither do we think that the availability of a 
remedy should depend upon the outcome of a race between 
counsel seeking habeas corpus or mandamus and the grand jury 
acting upon the charge. 124 
Under Article 330 the prosecutor would no longer be able to cut off 
the arrestee's right to a preliminary hearing by securing an indict-
ment. 12S 
The exact procedure suggested by the Code has not been imple-
mented in any state. Arguments opposing adoption of the Code include 
the fact that its broad provisions exceed the cursory, simplistic system 
mandated by Gerstein and the expense involved in enacting the Code 
rules. 
The major objection to an adversary probable cause hearing, such as 
the preliminary hearing, is the added expenditure involved. At present 
no empirical data exists concerning the costs of adversary preliminary 
examinations as opposed to the non-adversary, non-evidentiary 
variety.126 General expenses may safely be said to include stenographer 
costs, transcript costs, court employee costs, additional commissioners, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys.127 Off-setting these expenditures, 
however, is the probability that the incidental discovery accompanying 
such an evidentiary hearing should have the direct effect of increasing 
the number of guilty pleas entered before trial. An arrestee, who, with 
the advice of counsel, is made aware of the strength of the state's case 
may be more readily disposed to negotiate a plea early in the 
.J 
123. The standard for submitting a case to the jury varies in each jurisdiction. Whatever the 
state standard for submitting the case to the jury, that state standard should also be 
applied to the preliminary hearing. ld. at Commentary § 330.1. 
124. Blue v. United States, 343 F.2d 894, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1964) cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 
(1965) quoted in ABA-ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Commentary 
§ 330.1 at 592 (1975). . 
125. Contra, Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (an indictment 
establishes sufficient probable cause to hold an accused for trial thereby rendering a 
preliminary hearing unnecessary). 
126. Note, A Constitutional Right to Preliminary He~rings for All Pretrial Detainees, 48 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 158, 179-82 (1974); Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in 
Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771, 789-90 (1974). 
127. ld. 
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proceedings. 1211 On the other hand, the prosecutor may learn more 
quickly that the case would fail under the strict burden of proof 
required at trial and is not worth pursuing further. Certainly a situation 
in which there is no probable cause even to detain is not a very strong 
case from a prosecutorial viewpoint. This is particularly true in light of 
the fact that the probable cause warranting detention is not clearly 
differentiated by the court from the probable cause necessary to arrest 
and trial. 129 By eliminating weak prosecutions the state stands to save 
substantial jail and prisoner maintenance expenses, court costs and 
attorney costs for those defendants unable to afford private coun-
sel.l 30 
Another cost-saving feature of granting all arrestees a preliminary 
hearing to determine probability of conviction at trial is the chance to 
consolidate a variety of pretrial motions promoting efficient allocation 
of judicial resources and speeding the cases through the system. 
Evidence produced at the examination could be preserved for trial. 
Both the defense and the prosecution could profit by records of the 
examination as impeachment tools at trial. Finally, a form of cost 
savings would be the enhancement in the skill and participation by the 
commissioner. The necessity for a full hearing and dismissal of charges 
where a finding of probable cause cannot be sustained could con-
ceivably improve the commissioners' conduct in such matters as 
issuance of search warrants, and handling of bail hearings.13I A similar 
effect should be had on police conduct in that even greater care than is 
mandated by the Gerstein proceeding standards would be necessitated 
in the making of arrests. 
The increased expenditures required of a preliminary hearing and the 
potential economies occasioned by it are unknown factors. An analysis 
of what a defendant stands to lose by unwarranted prosecution, 
however, inevitably leads to the conclusion that this is an interest to be 
protected even at increased costs.1 32 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
128. Note, A Constitutional Right to Preliminary Hearings for All Pretrial Detainees, 48 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 158, 179-82 (1974). This contention is supported by California's 
experience with adversary hearings. In 1965-66 California municipal courts disposed of 
48,601 felony filings, of which 16,200 involved no hearing at all because of guilty pleas 
and dismissed charges and 31,896 involved limited hearings in which the prosecution's 
evidence was uncontested. Thus, the advice of counsel prior to such hearing and the 
limited discovery necessary prior to such hearing can have a significant effect on the 
outcome of the proceedings. Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal 
Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771, 792 n. 91 (1974). 
129. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 116-17; see note 22 supra. 
130. Note, A Constitutional Right to Preliminary Hearings for All Pretrial Detainees, 48 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 158, 179-82 (1974). 
131. [d.; Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 
YALE L.J. 771, 793-95 (1974). 
132. "It is fundamental that a deprivation of constitutional rights may not be justified upon 
economic considerations." Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 
676, 687 (D. Mass. 1973); accord, Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 139 (N.D. 
Cal. 1972); see Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Bishop, 
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in Gerstein severely limited the function of the probable cause 
determination, restricting it to a detennination of reasonable cause to 
detain, and sanctioning the elimination or disregard of adversary 
safeguards. But, since the Court did not expressly prohibit an 
evidentiary hearing with assistance of counsel the states remain at 
liberty to enact programs patterned after the Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The Code prOVISIons draw a reasonable compromise between the 
interests of the accused in securing his liberty and an expeditious end to 
the proceedings and the interests of the state in punishing criminal acts. 
The adversary proceedings recommended by the Code sharply contrast 
with Maryland's two examinations133 and the opportunity for a full 
preliminary hearing is accorded all arrestees, whether misdemeanants or 
felons. 
In its present fonn Maryland's response to Gerstein does not 
adequately protect the rights of citizens arrested without a warrant. 
Clearly, a prompt finding, for all accused, as to whether there is cause 
to proceed to trial is imperative. While Maryland has taken a significant 
step in the direction of fairer treatment for those accused of crime the 
state still has far to go in eliminating the injustices spawned by the new 
procedures. 
Shelly E. Mintz 
404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968). See also Goldberg v. KeUy, 397 U.S. 254,266 (1970) 
where the Court found that increased financial burdens did not justify denial of 
pre·termination evidentiary hearings for welfare recipients. 
133. See section II supra. 
